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OpinionGlossary
Agency: global motor control, including the subjective experience of action,
control, intention, motor selection and the conscious experience of will. It
involves the representation of goal-states.
Cognitive 1PP: arguably, this appears when a system possesses a concept of
the strong 1PP and is able to apply this concept to itself (i.e. it has an abstract
and active mental representation of itself as a subject of experience, which
includes a special form of cognitive self-reference) [3,6–8]. The cognitive 1PP
presupposes the capacity of self-reference in a more narrow sense, that is, to
mentally refer to oneself using a concept such as ‘I’, for example by
consciously thinking I-thoughts such as ‘I am happy’ or ‘I myself am a thinking
thing’ or ‘I myself am a subject of experience’. Many organisms might have
phenomenal self-models [6,23] (MPS), but perhaps only humans have self-
concepts.
Embodiment: a position in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind that
emphasizes the relevance of sensorimotor skills for general intelligence, the
situtatedness of cognition and the role that the body has in shaping the mind,
plus the subjective experience of using and ‘having’ a body. The concept is
used in many different ways. Different functional levels exist (Thomas
Metzinger [2007], Self models. Scholarpedia: www.scholarpedia.org/article/
Self_models).
Self-identification: the degree to which an organism identifies with the content
of a global body representation [7,24].
Self-location: a determinate volume in space, normally localized within the
bodily boundaries as represented. The origin of the weak 1PP is localized
within this volume (‘embedding principle’). Self-location is also necessarily
spatiotemporal self-location (because it includes the ‘now’, a determinate
position in time as represented). This is not discussed here [6].
Strong 1PP: this occurs when the model of the organism as a whole, given
through MPS, is represented as being directed at an object component
(including, potentially, the body itself). We speculate that a strong 1PP
necessarily (and minimally) involves the additional experience of being able
to control the focus of attention.
Weak 1PP: a purely geometrical feature of an egocentric model of reality, most
often referred to as a visuospatial model. A weak 1PP includes a spatial frame
of reference, plus a global body representation, with a perspective originatingWe highlight the latest research on body perception and
self-consciousness, but argue that despite these
achievements, central aspects have remained unex-
plored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-conscious-
ness. Researchers investigated central representations
of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected
the global and unitary character of self-consciousness,
the ‘I’ of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the
minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a
phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious
experience of being someone? What are necessary con-
ditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We
offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical
evidence from neurology and cognitive science and
argue that these findings offer a new entry point for
the systematic study of global and more fundamental
aspects of self-consciousness.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a flood of research into self-con-
sciousness, and a renewed interest in its bodily founda-
tions [1,2]. In philosophy of mind, there is widespread
agreement that the core of the problem consists of un-
derstanding the pre-reflective bodily foundations of
phenomenal selfhood (defined here as all those levels
which are independent of explicit cognition and linguistic
abilities, and which give rise to the subjective experience of
being a self), but which can function as enabling conditions
for a conceptually mediated, cognitive first-person
perspective and high-level social cognition [3–8]. Promi-
nent candidates are associated with notions such as ‘agen-
cy’ [9–11] and ‘embodiment’ (see Glossary). Here, we argue
that from a strategic point of view, future research should
focus on what we call ‘minimal phenomenal selfhood’
(MPS), which is related to the concept of embodiment
and the simplest form of self-consciousness.
To illustrate this, we review how researchers have
investigated embodiment and the bodily foundations of
self-consciousness through the sense of ownership and
identification with the body as a whole (phenomenally
experienced ‘mineness’), self-location (centeredness of
the conscious model of reality) and the first-person
perspective. Next, we introduce a conceptual distinctionCorresponding authors: Blanke, O. (olaf.blanke@epfl.ch);
Metzinger, T. (metzinger@uni-mainz.de).
1364-6613/$ – see front matter  2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.1between the conscious experience of ‘ownership for body
parts’ (as studied in the rubber-hand illusion (RHI) [12])
and the experience of ‘global ownership’ (as studied in the
full-body illusion [13]). We argue that only the latter
enables investigations of MPS, with MPS being a clearer
concept to guide future research. From a theory-of-science
point of view, and given a complex domain such as human
self-consciousness, we propose that an optimal strategy is
likely to be the (initial) isolation of the simplest form of the
target phenomenon. MPS is a phenomenal property,
namely the conscious experience of being a self . It is the
experience of being a distinct, holistic entity capable of
global self-control and attention, possessing a body and a
location in space and time.within this body representation. A visual (or auditory) weak 1PP possesses a
centre of projection, which functions as the geometrical origin of the ‘seeing’
(or ‘hearing’ etc.) organism’s embodied perspective.
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MPS can be analyzed on phenomenological, representa-
tional and functional levels of description. Central defining
features are, (i) a globalized form of identification with the
body as awhole (as opposed to ownership for body parts), (ii)
spatiotemporal self-location and (iii) a first-person perspect-
ive (1PP). It is important to differentiate between a weak
and at least two stronger readings of ‘first-person perspect-
ive’, with MPS being partly constituted by the weak 1PP,
and a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for stronger
versions [14–19].Aweak1PP isapurely geometrical feature
of a perceptual or imagined model of reality possessing a
point of projection functioning as its origin in sensory and
mental processing, but is not linked with theoretically more
chargednotions suchas ‘subject of experience’ (the conscious
self) or ‘epistemic subject’ (knowing self) [14–19]. A strong
1PP appears when the system as a whole is internally
represented as directed at an object component, for example
a perceptual object, an action goal as internally simulated or
perhaps the body as a whole. A strong 1PP is exactly what
makes consciousness subjective: the fact that a system
represents itself not only as a self but also as ‘a self in the
act of knowing’ [20] (Box 1). This means that the organism
represents itself as representing in real time. It
co-represents the representational relation during the
ongoing process of representation: a phenomenal self as
subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a
phenomenal model of the intentionality relation
[6,7,9,21,22] (Thomas Metzinger [2007] Self models. Scho-
larpedia: www.scholarpedia.org/article/Self_models). There
is an even stronger 1PP, which implies the possession of the
concept of a subject of experience, and the additional feature
of a given system to mentally apply this concept to itself
(‘cognitive 1PP’), which will not be discussed here [3,6–8].
HavingMPS is a necessary condition for the strong (and
the cognitive) 1PP, but not for the weak 1PP because the
weak 1PP is itself a constituting factor for MPS. A con-
scious body model defines a volume within a spatial frame
of reference (the dimension of ‘self-location’) within whichBox 1. Conceptual distinctions
Necessity
A condition ‘A’ is said to be necessary for a condition ‘B’, if (and only
if) the non-existence or non-occurrence of ‘A’ guarantees (or brings
about) non-existence of non-occurrence of ‘B’. We propose that MPS
is a necessary condition for the strong and cognitive 1PP.
Sufficiency
A condition ‘A’ is said to be sufficient for a condition ‘B’, if (and only if)
the existence or occurrence of ‘A’ guarantees (or brings about)
existence or occurrence of ‘B’. The existence of a conscious,
transparent and global body-representation available for attentional
access is a sufficient condition for MPS.
Necessary conditions that are not sufficient
There could be sets of conditions, which are individually necessary,
but not jointly sufficient. We claim that spatiotemporal self-location,
self-identification and weak 1PP are necessary and sufficient for MPS.
If there are further necessary conditions, then our claim is false.
Sufficient conditions that are not necessary
There could be various sets of (jointly) sufficient conditions, none of
which is individually necessary. Weak 1PP, self location and self
8the origin of theweak 1PP is localized (for temporal aspects
of self-location see Refs [6,18]). Because this conscious body
model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot
introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify
with its representational content and are consciously pre-
sent as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24]. It is
this bodily self or MPS which is altered and abnormal
during out-of-body experiences [23–25], heautoscopy (see
Box 2) [15,26,27] and experimentally manipulated during
the full-body illusion [13,28]. If parts of the conscious body-
model become phenomenally opaque, that is, if they are
experienced as a representation (Box 2), the dimension of
self-identification and consequently MPS can be wea-
kened.
The essence of selfhood, the representational content of
MPS, is that it indicates to the system that a specific state
in its internal neural dynamics has been reached, namely
an integrated functional state, which for the first time
makes the body available for attention and global control.
MPS, characterized by self-identification, self-location, and
weak 1PP, is the outcome of this process on the level of
conscious experience. MPS, the simplest form of selfhood,
is a representation of the entire body, being functionally
available for global control: a form of abstract (yet non-
propositional) knowledge about oneself and provides infor-
mation about new causal properties. MPS or any self-
representation are not static internal copies of some mys-
terious thing or individual substance (‘the’ self), but only
ongoing processes of tracking and controlling global bodily
properties – for example with the help of an explicit,
integrated body-model. ‘Global control’ is a process in
which a system controls global properties of itself (as
opposed to local properties). A global property is one that
can only meaningfully be ascribed to a given system as a
whole, often because it requires a new level of analysis
defined by a different logical subject. A drop of water is wet,
but none of the individual H2O molecules has the property
of ‘wetness’. Global properties of the human body are the
entire body’s surface or translation (linear passive motion)identification are jointly sufficient for MPS. Perhaps one or more of
them are not individually necessary.
Causally enabling conditions
Conditions that have a causal role in bringing about a phenomenon,
but are not strictly necessary (and frequently, if taken by themselves,
not even sufficient). In striking a match, the presence of oxygen is a
nomologically necessary condition for ignition, whereas my hand
executing the motion of scratching it is only causally enabling
because this motion could also be carried out by a machine. The
temporally preceding experience of agency and of global motor
control (e.g. in childhood) causally enables MPS in practically all
humans, but it is not causally necessary (because there are other
causal routes to the same phenomenon). Out-of-body experiences of
neurological origin and the selective experimental manipulation of
the dimensions of self-location and self-identification demonstrate
that agency only belongs to the causal background for MPS.
Therefore, it is not a metaphysically necessary condition for the
target phenomenon to come into existence, nor part of the minimal
supervenience base. Conceptually, what constitutes MPS is some-
thing different or less that could also take place in a disembodied,
non-neural, artificial system possessing no effectors.
Box 2. Illusory global own body perceptions
Illusory own body perceptions are characterized by seeing a second
own body in extracorporeal space [15,24,47–49]. We describe weak
1PP, self-location and self-identification for each illusory perception.
Out-of-body experience
Self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are at the position of the
illusory body at a position that ismost often elevatedwith respect to the
position of the physical body as represented [15,48]. Self-location and
the origin of the weak 1PP are never at the position of the physical body
as represented, and out-of-body experiences are associated with a
sense of disembodiment (the experience that the subject of conscious
experience is localized outside the person’s bodily borders) [23]. Self-
identification refers to the illusory body, not the physical body as
represented. All three dimensions of the MPS are pathological. The
strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are
characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent self-
identification with the incorrect content of a global body representation
[55,63]). Out-of-body experiences are highly realistic, and most often
there is no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon [23].
Autoscopic hallucination
Self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are at the position of the
physical body as represented. There is no sense of disembodiment
and self-identification refers to the physical body as represented. All
three dimensions of the MPS are normal [23,26]. The person sees an
illusory own body in front of him, but has preserved insight into the
illusory character of the phenomenon.
Heautoscopy
Self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are either at the position
of the physical body as represented or at the position of the illusory
body as represented or at both positions at the same time [50]. Both
MPS dimensions can change their experienced position (between the
position of the illusory and the physical body as represented) and this
can occur in rapid alternation [23]. The origin of auditory and visual
weak 1PP can be dissociated and experienced at different positions.
The position of self-location and weak 1PP can also differ [23].
Heautoscopy is sometimes associated with ‘bi-location’ (the experi-
ence that self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are simulta-
neously at different positions). Self-identification either refers to the
illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to
both, in alternation or simultaneously. Heautoscopy is often asso-
ciated with the sensation of ‘being split in two selves’ [23]. All three
dimensions of the MPS are pathological as is the strong 1PP.
Heautoscopy is highly realistic and the person has most often no
insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.
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fingertip or hand translation (Box 1). The possession of
MPS, of a strong or even cognitive 1PP are also global
properties, they are not things that individual parts can
possess. If the integration processes leading to the
phenomenal self-model [6,8] are disturbed (if certain states
are isolated from global control), then disturbances of
bodily self-consciousness will appear and these might
affect certain body parts, in addition to the entire body.
The same principle also applies to specific emotional or
cognitive states: they become your feelings and thoughts by
being embedded into the phenomenal self-model – which,
in standard situations, is already more complex than mere
MPS [6,8,9]. MPS and its dimensions have the potential to
describe the phenomenology associated with such func-
tional deficits in an adequate and conceptually fine-grained
manner.
Partial versus global ownership
Ownership for a body part can break down after damage to
right temporo-parietal cortex, this is known as somatopar-
aphrenia [29–31]. Somatoparaphrenic patients most often
misattribute their contralesional hand as belonging to
another person, mostly a familiar person (e.g. a doctor,
nurse or friend) [31]. Other somatoparaphrenic patients
suffer form the opposite pattern and self-attribute other
people’s hands when these are presented in their contrale-
sional hemispace [29]. Somatoparaphrenia affects only the
contralesional (mostly left) hand (or foot), and never ipsile-
sional body parts. Somatoparaphrenia should be distin-
guished from other bodily symptoms reflecting disturbed
partial ownership and/or agency [31].
Errors in partial ownership have also been induced
experimentally in healthy subjects during the RHI by
using a fake hand and multisensory conflict [12]. Viewing
a fake hand being stroked by a paintbrush in synchrony
with strokes applied to one’s own corresponding (but
occluded) hand can induce the tactile illusion that the fakehand is touched. Subjects might also report ownership for
the fake hand. In addition, there is a change in perceived
hand position (the hand is experienced as though it is
displaced towards the fake hand’s position). The RHI is
abolishedwhen the stroking is asynchronous [32,33]. Brain
imaging studies associated the RHI with bilateral acti-
vations in several brain regions [34,35], yet this is only
partly compatible with data on somatoparaphrenia that
highlight the importance of temporo-parietal cortex and
the right hemisphere.
Despite their importance for the study of body owner-
ship, somatoparaphrenia and RHI are only associated with
changes in partial ownership and do not enable the inves-
tigation of MPS as the most fundamental sense of selfhood.
MPS is associated with global, fully embodied self-con-
sciousness and is experienced as a single feature, namely
a coherent representation of the whole, spatially situated
body – and not as multiple representations of separate
body parts (i.e. finger [33,36], hand [12] or hemibody [37]).
Accordingly, MPS is not altered in somatoparaphrenic
patients and not manipulated in healthy subjects during
the RHI because these studies do not experimentally
manipulate self-location, self-identification or the weak
1PP [38].
Neural mechanisms of partial ownership and self-
identification are also likely to differ. Neurons in primary
somatosensory cortex (area 3b) have tactile receptive fields
that respond preferentially to stimuli applied to a specific
body part (i.e. fingertip [39]). Neurons in higher-tier soma-
tosensory cortex (i.e. area 5) have larger receptive fields
responding to cutaneous stimuli applied to hands, but also
proximal parts of an extremity or the back [40–42].
Neurons in ventral intraparietal area (areaVIP) [43]might
encode the entire or large parts of the body surface [44].
Latter cells will discharge to a cutaneous stimulus that is
applied anywhere on the body surface. We argue that cells
in area VIP and 5 are of importance for self-identification
and other MPS-dimensions, whereas cells representing9
Figure 2. Location of brain damage for each of the three illusory global own-body
perceptions (autoscopic phenomena) leading to alterations of MPS. Analysis of
lesion overlap of brain damage in patients with autoscopic hallucinations shows a
centre of damage in the right parieto-occipital or right temporo-occipital cortex
(lesion reconstruction was estimated based on 7 patients [26]). For out-of-body
experiences, damage was localized primarily in right temporo-parietal cortex (n=
12 [27,51]) and for heautoscopy in left temporo-parietal cortex (n= 1028). Lesion
overlap was estimated based on magnetic resonance imaging data (acquired by of
one of the authors) and detailed neuroradiological and neuropathological data
reported in the literature. Although single cases of each type of autoscopic
phenomenon have been reported after damage to the right or left hemisphere, we
indicated in the figure the hemisphere of predominant involvement in autoscopic
hallucination (right), heautoscopy (left) and out-of-body experience (right).
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related aspects. Another sensory system important for
global body representation and MPS is the vestibular
system because it encodes translation and rotation of
the body in addition to orientation with respect to gravity
[45,46].
Abnormal MPS in neurology
MPS breaks down in neurological patients with illusory
global own body perceptions, called autoscopic phenomena
[23,27,37,47–49], that are characterized by seeing a second
own body in extracorporeal space: autoscopic hallucina-
tion, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experience (Figure 1)
(Box 2). Autoscopic phenomena are associated with multi-
sensory disintegration and can be caused by focal brain
damage (Figure 2) [26,27]. Recent neuroanatomical
analysis indicated that autoscopic hallucinations are pre-
ferentially caused by damage to right parieto-occipital or
right temporo-occipital cortex, whereas heautoscopy and
out-of-body experience are caused by damage to temporo-
parietal cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respect-
ively [27,47].
Autoscopic phenomena show that not only identification
with and localization of body parts but also the conscious
representation of the entire body and MPS can be dis-
turbed [45] (Box 2). Patients with autoscopic hallucina-
tions experience themselves to be localized at, and to see
from, the physical body’s position as represented. Self-
identification is referred to the global representation ofFigure 1. Phenomenology of three illusory own body perceptions (autoscopic
phenomena) leading to alterations of MPS. Autoscopic phenomena are defined as
illusory own body perceptions characterized by seeing a second own body in
extracorporeal space. The three autoscopic phenomena differ with respect to self-
location and the weak 1PP. During autoscopic hallucinations, the person sees a
second illusory own body from the habitual weak 1PP with normal self-location (at
the physical body as represented). During an out-of-body experience, self-location
and the weak 1PP are at the position of the illusory body as represented (at a
position that is most often elevated with respect to the position of the physical
body as represented). Heautoscopy is an intermediate form and self-location and
the origin of the weak 1PP are either at the position of the physical body as
represented or at the position of the illusory body as represented or at both
positions. Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the
physical body as represented or to both. For each autoscopic phenomenon, the
physical position of the patient’s body is schematically represented by the solid
body and that of the illusory body by the transparent body. The location and
direction of the visual weak 1PP is indicated by an arrow. Self-location is where the
patient has the impression that they are located (indicated by ‘SL’). The patient has
the impression to see the environment from the physical body as represented in
the case of autoscopic hallucination, from the illusory body as represented in the
case of out-of-body experience and alternatively or simultaneously from the
physical and the illusory body as represented in the case of heautoscopy (after
[23]). For further detail, see Box 2.
10the physical body (Figure 1). All three MPS dimensions
(self-identification, self-location, weak 1PP) are normal.
Heautoscopy is characterized by abnormality in all three
MPS dimensions. Self-location and weak 1PP are either at
the position of the physical body as represented or at the
position of the illusory body as represented, or at both.
Moreover, self-location and weak 1PP might change their
experienced position (between the position of the illusory
and the physical body as represented) and this can occur in
rapid alternation. Self-identification either refers to the
illusory body as represented, the physical body as
represented or to both in alternation [23,27,49] (Box 2).
In out-of-body experiences the weak 1PP, self-location and
self-identification with an illusory body as represented at
an extracorporeal position are complete: self-location and
weak 1PP are localized outside one’s bodily borders and
people have the experience of seeing their body from this
disembodied location (Figure 1). Out-of-body experiences
are associated with a sense of disembodiment and people
always self-identify with the illusory body as represented.
These neurological autoscopic phenomena demonstrate
how global bodily experience varies along MPS dimen-
sions. In particular, there seems to be a continuum be-
tween transparency and opacity, which determines how
realistically the content of a body representation is experi-
enced and how strongly the dimension of self-identification
is expressed [6,7].
To summarize, heautoscopy and out-of-body experi-
ences are examples of abnormal MPS, also extending to
impairments of the strong 1PP (characterized by self-
identification with an incorrect content of a global body
representation). Although MPS is modified differently in
heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences, MPS does per-
sist in both conditions (a situated body as represented is
always the object of self-identification). Autoscopic hallu-
cinations are also conceptually relevant (but as neurologi-
cal control conditions of MPS) because, despite their
neurological origin (presence of an illusory own body per-
ception, distinct neural correlate), they are characterized
Figure 3. Experimenting withMPS using the full-body illusion. (a) Experimental set-
up of the seminal self-observations made at the end of the 19th century by G.M.
Stratton [54]. Through the use of a portable mirror system, Stratton [54] was able to
project an online image of his body in his anterior peripersonal space while he was
wandering through the countryside around Berkeley. He described changes in self-
location and self-identification that progressively increased over the three days of
exposure. (b,c) Experimental set-up of the full-body illusion [13]. Participant (physical
subject [PS] in dark blue trousers) sees through a head-mounted display (HMD)
either a virtual fake body (VF, pink trousers) or a virtual non-corporeal object (VO,
light gray) being stroked synchronously or asynchronously with his back. Dark
colours indicate the actual location of the physical body/object whereas light colours
represent the virtual body/object seen on the HMD. Participants’ self-identification
and self-location was modified, leading to self-identification only with the virtual
body and a drift in self-location towards the virtual body to an extracorporeal
position, especially during synchronous stroking. (d) Alternative experimental set-up
of the full-body illusion [28]. Participant sees through a HMD the own body being
stroked synchronously or asynchronously, yet stroking is applied at the chest
(unseen) and in front of the camera. This induced the experience of being at the
position of the camera that was behind the subjects’ body and diminished self-
identification with the virtual body during synchronous stroking.
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anisms for the dimensions of self-identification, self-
location and weak 1PP are linked because changes in weak
1PP and self-location are often experienced as spatially
congruent: if the geometrical point of origin for the weak
1PP is experienced at an extracorporeal position as in
heautoscopy, self-location is also experienced at this pos-
ition. Self-identification is often strongest for this position
as well.
Further observations on MPS dimensions in
autoscopic phenomena
In the majority of such autoscopic phenomena, MPS is
characterized by a single visual weak 1PP, spatially over-
lapping self-location and non-ambiguous self-identifi-
cation. Although under normal conditions humans
experience a single visual weak 1PP, autoscopic phenom-
ena indicate that conscious experience can also be charac-
terized by the absence of a unitary visual weak 1PP, or by
two simultaneous or rapidly alternating visual weak 1PPs.
This is the case in patients with heautoscopy who claim to
jump back and forth between two spatially distinct points
of view [23,50]. Other patients can describe an auditory
weak 1PP that is spatially distinct from their simul-
taneously present visual weak 1PP [23]. Moreover, the
weak 1PP (auditory or visual, or both) does not always
overlap with the location of the bodily self. The origin of the
weak 1PP can be spatially dissociated from self-location as
indicated by a recent study using electrical brain stimu-
lation [51]. Especially during heautoscopy (with rapidly
alternating or two simultaneous centres of projection for
the weak 1PP), patients can report to ‘be split in two parts
or selves’, feeling as if ‘I were two persons’ [52] or a ‘split
personality’ [53]. This indicates that a breakdown of a
single weak 1PP or the loss of spatial congruency between
the weak 1PP and self-location has important con-
sequences for MPS and the strong 1PP [27]. With respect
to self-identification, these observations indicate that there
seems to be a transient, but nevertheless complete, heau-
toscopic dissociation into two objects of identification, lead-
ing to a brief double instantiation of MPS (two selves) and
the strong 1PP (a reduplication of the experience of being
directed) that does not occur in any other form of autoscopic
phenomenon.
Experimenting with MPS
Recent studies have extended clinical data on illusory
global own body perceptions and studied MPS experimen-
tally, refining the seminal self-observations made at the
end of the 19th century by G.M. Stratton (Figure 3a) [54].
By exposing participants to conflicting multisensory bodily
cues by means of mirrors, video technology or simple
virtual reality devices [13,28,55,56], these authors exper-
imentally manipulated MPS. In particular, the presen-
tation of stimuli in virtual reality set-ups has enabled
systematic manipulations of different sensory dimensions
including somatosensory, visual and perspectival cues.
In a study by Lenggenhager and colleagues [13], an
experimental protocol similar to that in the RHI [12]
was developed for the full body (full-body illusion;
Figure 3b). A video camera with a 3D-encoder was placedbehind the subject and relayed to a head mounted display.
Tactile stimulation (stroking) was applied on the back and
the visual information related to this stimulation was
systematically manipulated by displaying it as either syn-
chronously or asynchronously with the tactile sensation.11
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cation and perceived body position (drift) to quantify self-
location. When the participants saw their body in front of
themselves, being stroked synchronously (with their own
back), they felt as if the virtual bodywas their own (illusory
self-identification) and showed drift towards it (illusory
self-location). Both full-body illusion measures were also
observed for a fake body (Figure 3c), but not (or less so) for a
rectangular object. The full-body illusion was abolished
during asynchronous stroking. Ehrsson [28] used a similar
set–up but stroked subjects on their chests (hidden from
the view of the camera). In this full-body illusion version,
subjects saw the synchronous stroking in front of the
camera, inducing the experience of being at the position
of the camera that was behind the subjects’ body (illusory
self-identification; Figure 3d). This shows that with
slightly different manipulations of how visual and tactile
stroking is applied and projected, MPS can bemanipulated
in a predictable fashion. Both studies revealed visual
capture by showing that the location of the visual stroking
dominates over the location of tactile stroking, leading in
both cases to abnormal self-identification and, in the study
of Lenggenhager et al., also to abnormal self-location
[38,57]. Accordingly, abnormal self-identification coincided
with the location of the visual information of the stroking
and corresponds either to the visual body representation
(virtual body [13]) or to the origin of the visual weak 1PP
(camera [28]). Although more experimental work is
needed, these data indicate that the experience of self-
location in terms of MPS can be separated experimentally
from the experience of the spatial origin of the visual weak
1PP [13,57] and from the location of the visual body [28,57].
This is compatible with clinical data [23,38,51,58] in which
both types of dissociations have been observed in patients
with heautoscopy or out-of-body experiences (i.e. a patient
[51] experienced the visual weak 1PP at the position of his
body, but self-location 2 m behind his body as
represented). From the definition of out-of-body experiences
(Box 2) it also follows that both study protocols did neither
induce an out-of-body experience nor an autoscopic hallu-
cination, but rather a state that is comparable to heauto-
scopy. Both study protocols enabled themanipulation of the
key MPS-dimensions self-identification, self-location or
weak 1PP, yet neither of themmanaged tomanipulatewhat
we have called the strong 1PP that is disturbed in heauto-
scopy and out-of-body experience.We predict thatmethodo-
logical approaches using multiple audio-visuo-spatial
perspectives, multiple and spatially incongruent body pos-
itions, might lead to experimental effects beyond those
described earlier and also involve the strong 1PP (maybe
even aspects of the cognitive 1PP). This might be further
facilitated through the more extensive use of virtual reality
technology [59–62] and perhaps through repeated and pro-
longed exposure to such artificial bodily signals as cham-
pioned by G.M. Stratton [54] over a century ago.
Although it is obviously not necessary tomaster concepts
(such as the first-person pronoun ‘I’) or symbolic language to
enjoy MPS, many recent authors have thought that agency
is a necessary condition to actualizeMPS. The experience of
being the author of one’s actions and to be able to selectively
control a body at will with the help of explicit goal-repres-12entations certainly is a central enabling condition for the
development of MPS [11]. However, the reviewed clinical
and experimental data show how a passive, multisensory
and globalized experience of ‘owning’ a body is sufficient for
minimal conscious selfhood. If, as we propose, ‘global own-
ing’ – functionally defined as availability of an integrated,
transparent and global representation of the spatiotem-
porally situatedbody – is the simplest formof self-conscious-
ness, then it follows that MPS is constituted by something
‘less’ than agency. Global motor control or cognitive self-
referencearenotnecessary conditions.Wespeculate that for
the transition from MPS to the strong 1PP, attentional
access [26] is necessary. Agency might be a sufficient con-
dition for MPS, but it does not belong to the metaphysically
necessary part of the minimal supervenience base for
phenomenal selfhood, the set of properties which ‘constitu-
tes’ our scientific target phenomenon. These and future
experimental findings (Box 1) about MPS and related
non-conceptual aspects of the self-model and their neuro-
functional correlates might change the way we think about
higher-levels of conscious self-representation, about the
strong and cognitive 1PP, and the notion of ‘a’ self, as such.
For now, our main point is that future research should
concentrate on isolating the ‘minimal’ formof self-conscious-
ness, and that full-body illusions are an interesting new
entry point for research. A first step has already been taken:
bodily agency is a causally enabling, but not a constitutive
condition, for phenomenal selfhood.
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